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Adjudicating Violations of International
Law: Defining the Scope of
Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort
Statute- Trajano v. Marcos
Sung Teak Kim*
Introduction
The proper scope of the Alien Tort Statute' (ATS) has been an issue of
uncertainty since its enactment in 1789.2 Its uncertain status recently
increased when victims of human rights violations invoked it to obtain
jurisdiction over defendants.3 The increase in both the use of the ATS4
and the relative importance of the judicial rulings brought under the ATS
makes the resolution of this problem crucial.5
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 1994; A.B., University of Chicago, 1991.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). The Alien Tort Statute [hereinafter ATS] is also
referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). See, e.g., Benjamins v. British Euro-
pean Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) and
Jeffery M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. ITr'L LJ. 53
(1981).
2. The ATS was first enacted as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. 73, 77.
3. The first case to invoke § 1350 jurisdiction over a human rights case was Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), a case involving torture and wrongful
death; see infra part I.B.1. When Filartiga showed that § 1350 could be used to obtain
jurisdiction over human rights cases, other actions arising from similar fact patterns
followed. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1992) and, most recently, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
.4. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-6 (1985). Professor Randall's
research compared the number of cases before and after Filartiga, supra note 3, in
which the plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the ATS. From his work, Professor Ran-
dall has been able to conclude that, as compared to the first 191 years of its existence,
the ATS has become much more popular after Filartiga and has been asserted in a wide
variety of fact patterns.
5. The recent Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992), is not, as some hoped, the legislative answer to the controversy over the ATS.
While the Act, being a codification of the Filartiga decision, settles the controversial
issues in cases dealing with similar factual situations, it unfortunately does not cover
many of the cases that may be brought under the ATS. Kathryn L. Pryor, Note, Does the
Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 VA.J.
INT'L L. 969, 1010-26 (1989). Therefore, the controversial issues surrounding the ATS
must be resolved by other means.
27 CORNm.L Irr' L.J. 387 (1994)
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The authoritative cases on this subject have expressed divergent
views 6 and have lead one judge to conclude that only the Supreme Court
can settle this dispute.7 The Supreme Court, however, has yet to take the
opportunity to hear the dispute.
In Trajano v. Marcos,8 the Ninth Circuit heightened the controversy by
adding yet another interpretation of the ATS, thus exacerbating the split
among the circuits. Continued Supreme Court inactivity will lead to much
confusion, inconsistent application among the circuits, and, inevitably,
injustice.
This Note considers the issues involved in defining the scope of the
ATS, as applied in prior cases, and the statute's potential application in
future cases. Part I describes the background of the ATS and explains how
previous courts have ruled on these issues. Part II then examines the
Trajano decision in detail. Finally, part III compares the rulings of the
Ninth Circuit with those of other circuits, evaluates their applications of
the ATS, and suggests alternative interpretations and applications of the
ATS.
I. Background
The ATS was initially part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 9 The ATS provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations10 or a
treaty of the United States.""
Although the ATS authorized federal jurisdiction over appropriate
cases,' 2 this obscure jurisdictional statute laid dormant for most of its
existence. Prior to 1980, litigants successfully invoked this nearly 200 year
6. The two circuit court cases which have completely considered the ATS are Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala from the Second Circuit, see infra part I.B.I., and Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), see infta part I.B.2.
7. Judge Edwards has stated that this "area of the law ... cries out for clarification
by the Supreme Court." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
8. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
9. The statute originally read:
Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That the district courts ... shall also have
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77.
10. While traditionally referred to as the "law of nations," modem legal scholars
have relabeled this body of law "international law." The two terms are synonymous.
BLAcK's LAW DIcioNARY 816, 886 (6th ed. 1990); David Cole et al., Interpreting the Alien
Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in
Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HAsTrNGs INT'L & COMp. L. Rv. 1, 3 (1988).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). Throughout the years, there have been several
changes in the wording of the statute, but the substantive meaning of the statute has
not been significantly affected. For a more detailed history of the statute, see William
IL Casto, The Federal Courts'ProtectiveJurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 467, 468 n.4 (1986).
12. As a part of The Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was a component of Congress's
first enactment defining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
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old statute to confer jurisdiction only twice. 13 This lack of precedent, in
conjunction with an absence of legislative intent,14 has led to uncertainty
in the application of the statute. The two principal controversies sur-
rounding the ATS are the determination of the statute's scope and decid-
ing whether the statute creates a cause of action.
A. Actionable Defendants Under the ATS: Jurisdiction over Foreign
Sovereigns
A major limitation on ATS jurisdiction is that the statute does not confer
subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. 15 In these actions, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 16 (FSIA) must "be applied by the dis-
trict courts in every action against [the] foreign sovereign....-17
In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess,18 the plaintiffs, two Liberian cor-
porations, alleged that an Argentine military aircraft bombed the Hercu-
les, an oil tanker owned and operated by the plaintiff corporations, in
international waters and in violation of international law.19 The plaintiffs
sought to recover for damage to the ship and cargo by suing in New York
federal district court under the ATS.2 0 The district court dismissed the
case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,2 1 and the Second Circuit
reversed.22
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and dis-
missed the claims, 23 stating that the ATS does not authorize U.S. courts to
render judgments against foreign states, but rather that "the FSIA [is] the
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction of a foreign state in our courts." 24
13. The two cases which invoked ATSjurisdiction were Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas.
810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (a French citizen brought an action for restitution of
"neutral property," slave cargo on a Spanish ship owned by a neutral, British owner,
captured as a prize of war) and Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (a Leba-
nese father sued an Iraqi mother for custody of his daughter. The plaintiff claimed
jurisdiction under the ATS alleging that falsifying a passport to bring a child into the
United States and concealing a child's nationality were violations of international law as
required by the ATS.).
14. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 Am.J. INT'L L. 461,463 n.15 (1989) (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (1984) (Bork, J., concurring)).
15. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
17. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434-35 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983)).
18. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
19. Id. at 431-32. Plaintiffs alleged that attacking a neutral ship which clearly identi-
fied itself was in violation of international law. Id. at 432.
20. Id. at 432.
21. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
22. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1987).
23. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 443.
24. Id. at 434. The Court gleaned from the language, structure, and the legislative
history of the FSIA that Congress intended the FSIA to be the only statute conferring
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. The Court also considered the history of the ATS
and rejected the plaintiffs' arguments stating that "[i]n light of the comprehensiveness
Cornell International Law Journal
Amerada Hess thus effectively eliminated foreign sovereigns from the
pool of possible defendants in an ATS action. 25 After Amerada Hess, fed-
eral courts could obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign through the ATS only in the following two situations: 1) where the
FSIA does not apply, i.e., where the defendant cannot be considered a
"foreign state" as defined by the FSIA,2 6 or 2) where the FSIA does not
afford immunity to the foreign sovereign because the action falls within
one of the FSIA's exceptions. 27 The relevant question not answered by
Amerada Hess is: since defendants of an ATS action must violate interna-
tional law, and since, traditionally, only states can violate international law,
who remains subject to suit as proper defendants under the ATS?
B. The Filartiga and Tel-Oren Decisions: Three Constructions of the
ATS
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala28
In Filartiga, Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly, both citizens of Para-
guay, brought suit against Americo Pena-Irala, also a citizen of Paraguay,
for the torture and wrongful death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen year old
of the statutory scheme in the FSIA, we doubt that even the most meticulous draftsman
would have concluded that Congress also needed to [enact a pr tanto repealer of] the
Alien Tort Statute...." Id. at 437. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's reason-
ing, see ChristopherJanney, Recent Developments, ObtainingJurisdiction overForeign Sov-
ereigns: The Alien Tort Statute Meets the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989), 31 HARv. INT'L
LJ. 368 (1989).
25. Janney, supra note 24, at 374.
26. Section 1603(a) of the FSIA defines "foreign state" as including a political subdi-
vision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; § 1603(b)
then elaborates on the meaning of "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 28
U.S.C. § 1603.
27. The FSIA is structured so that section 1604 provides foreign sovereigns general
immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless an exception, as provided by sec-
tions 1605-07, applies. Sections 1605-07, then, proceeds to enumerate situations, mostly
involving the foreign sovereign as a private commercial actor, in which the sovereign is
not immune from suit. Section 1330(a) authorizes the district courts to hear actions
against foreign sovereigns where one of the exceptions applies. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1604-07. Describing the operation of the FSIA, the Supreme Court said that:
Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in tandem: § 1604 bars federal and state
courts from exercisingjurisdiction when a foreign state is entitled to immunity,
and § 1330(a) confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear suits brought by
United States citizens and by aliens when a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity.
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434.
Even after Amerada Hess, if one of the exceptions apply and the foreign sovereign is
not entitled to immunity from suit in U.S. courts, the sovereign is subject to suit in the
federal courts under the ATS if all the elements of the ATS are satisfied. An example of
such an occurrence is Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp.
246 (D.D.C. 1985). In Von Darde4 the court determined that the U.S.S.R., inargnably a
foreign sovereign, was not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. Id. at 252-56. More-
over, the court stated that subject-matter jurisdiction would also be proper under the
ATS. Id. at 259.
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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son, Joelito Filartiga.2 9 The plaintiffs alleged that in 1976, Pena-Irala, the
then Inspector General of Police of Asunci6n, kidnapped Joelito and tor-
tured him to death in retaliation for his father's political activities and
long-standing opposition to the ruling government.s0 All relevant acts
took place in Paraguay.3 ' After a fruitless criminal action in the
Paraguayan courts against Pena-Irala,3 2 the Filartigas, having attained resi-
dence in the United States, brought a civil suit against Pena-Irala in the
Eastern District of New York while Pena-Irala was in the country on a visi-
tor's visa.3 3 The district court, ruling that the "violation of the law of
nations" element of the ATS was not satisfied, dismissed the case for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 4 The Second Circuit reversed and held
that the ATS did confer jurisdiction over the claim.3 5
In deciding that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the matter,
the Second Circuit made several crucial rulings. First, the court ruled that
"an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in deten-
tion violates established norms of the international law of human rights,
and hence the law of nations."3 6 To reach this conclusion, the Second
Circuit had to ascertain the established norms of international law3 7 "by
consulting the works of jurists, . . . the general usage and practice of
nations[, and] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."3 8
Among the sources consulted were the United Nations Charter,39 General
Assembly resolutions,40 several international treaties and accords,4 1 docu-
ments expressing U.S. policy on the matter,42 and a judicial opinion.43
29. Id. at 878.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 878, 880.
33. Id. at 878-79.
34. Id. at 880.
35. Id. at 878.
36. Id. at 880.
37. The court held that to determine whether the "violations of international law"
element of the ATS is satisfied, the court must determine the state of international law
at the time of the action. "[C]ourts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today." Id. at 881
(citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
198 (1796)).
38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 160-61 (1820)).
39. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
40. Id. at 882. Among the General Assembly resolutions considered were the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), which states "no one shall be subjected to torture" and
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, GA. Res. 3452, U.N.,
GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
41. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84.
42. Id. at 884. Documents evidencing U.S. policy included the Department of
State's Countty Reports on Human Rights for 1979. HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HuMAN RGHTS FOR 1979 Introduction at 1 (Joint Comm. Print 1980); Memorandum
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) [hereinafter Filartiga Memo], repiinted in David Cole, Jules Lobel, and Harold
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After perusal of these sources, the Second Circuit determined that "inter-
national law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own
governments," including the right to be free from torture.
44
Secondly, the court ruled that, although all relevant acts occurred in
Paraguay and all the parties were Paraguayan citizens, U.S. federal courts
still have jurisdiction under the ATS.45 The Second Circuit justified juris-
diction over the matter by the theory of transitory torts.4 6 This theory,
long established by English common law,4 7 provides that liability for cer-
tain tortious acts follow the tortfeasor, such that he could be subject to suit
for that act in any forum. The court held that the claims for torture and
wrongful death were transitory torts, and thus, adjudicable in the United
States regardless of the place of occurrence.4 8
In addition to these two explicit rulings, the Second Circuit, in dicta,
indicated that a state official acting under color of government authority is
a proper defendant of an ATS action. Jurisdiction over such a defendant
is valid even if his actions were not authorized by his government but, in
fact, contrary to the laws and policies of his government.49
Finally, contrary to some interpretations of Filartiga,5 0 the Second Cir-
cuit did not decide the issue of whether the ATS provides a private right of
action.5 ' The Filartiga court held only that the ATS conferred upon fed-
eral courts the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.52 The Second
Hongju Koh, Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International
Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1,
34-47 (1988).
43. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 n.16. The judicial opinion was from the European
Court of Human Rights.
44. Id. at 885. The list of fundamental rights afforded by international law was later
extended in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In addition to
torture, the District Court of Northern California held that the following two violations
were also prohibited by international law: prolonged, arbitrary detention without trial
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-43. For a
more detailed discussion of Forti v. Suarez-Mason and its potential ramifications in
human rights cases, see Allison J. Flom, Note, Human Rights Litigation Under the Alien
Tort Statute: Is the Forti v. Suarez-Mason Decision the Last of Its Kind?, B.C. TIm WoRLt
LJ. 321 (1990).
45. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
46. Id.
47. The case establishing the doctrine of transitory torts is Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1
Cowp. 161 (1774) (Lord Mansfield, J.). The U.S. Supreme Court, quoting Mostyn,
adopted the doctrine of transitory torts in McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248
(1843).
48. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
49. Id. at 889-90.
50. Several commentators and courts interpret Filartiga to have ruled that the ATS
does provide a private cause of action. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 777-82 (Edwards,
J., concurring); Filartiga Memo, supra note 42, at 21 ("AsJudge Edwards in Tel-Oren and
Judge Jensen in Forti made clear, Filartiga has established that 'section 1350 itself pro-
vides a right to sue for alleged violations of the law of nations.'") (footnote omitted)
(quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 780 (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
51. Clyde H. Crockett, The Role of Federal Common Law in Alien Tort Statute Cases, 14
B.C. INTr'L & COMP. L. REv. 29,37 (1991) ("[Tlhe Filartiga opinion did not hold that the
Alien Tort Statute creates a cause of action.").
52. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
Vol 27
1994 Adjudicating Violations of International Law
Circuit distinguished between the law of nations that confers jurisdiction
under the ATS and the substantive law that creates a cause of action and is
applied in deciding the merits of the case. 53 In fact, the court noted that
"it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new
rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication
of the rights already recognized by international law."54 This language
suggests that the ATS does not provide a private cause of action.55 On
remand, the district court awarded damages for wrongful death, court
costs, and attorney's fees under Paraguayan law.56 Additional punitive
damages were awarded on the basis of international law.57 The basis of
the award in Filartiga suggests that the ATS does not create a cause of
action, but rather that the plaintiff must have a cause of action independ-
ent of the ATS. The court's resort to Paraguayan law to determine dam-
ages suggests that the actual cause of action was created by the domestic
law of Paraguay.
2. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 58
On March 8, 1978, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) entered Israel, seized a civilian bus, and took its passengers hos-
tage.59 Wounded civilian victims and survivors of those killed sued in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia60 and named as
defendants the Libyan Arab Republic, the PLO, the Palestine Information
Office, and the National Association of Arab Americans. 61 The plaintiffs
asserted jurisdiction under the "federal question" statute62 and the ATS.
The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.63
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed. 64 Each of the three judges hearing
the case, however, issued a separate concurring opinion with vastly diver-
gent rationales justifying their unanimous decision. This section discusses
the construction of the ATS provided by Judges Edwards and Bork.
65
53. Id. at 889.
54. Id. at 887.
55. See Crockett, supra note 51, at 37 ("Rather, the court['s] language suggests that
the Alien Tort Statute is purely a jurisdictional statute.").
56. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
57. Id. Although international law was the supposed basis of the punitive damages,
there is not a generally accepted practice of awarding punitive damages in international
law. Most of the cases relied on to award punitive damages were U.S. cases applying
U.S. domestic law. See Casto, supra note 11, at 478 n.57 and accompanying text.
58. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 799.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 798.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
63. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
64. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
65. This section does not include Judge Robb's concurrence in Tel-Oren. Although
his opinion addresses the proper application of the ATS by the courts, it does not pro-
pose a construction of the ATS. Rather, resorting to the political question doctrine,
Judge Robb believes that many cases coming under the ATS contain problems that the
other two branches, and not the courts, are better able to handle. Judge Robb's opin-
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a. Judge Bork: ATS does not expressly create a cause of action and
separation of powers principles counsel against implying one
Judge Bork relied on the constitutional principle of separation of powers
to argue that the plaintiffs did not have an independent cause of action to
support ATSjurisdiction.66 First, he presumed that plaintiffs must have a
cause of action for the courts to have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
controversy. Second, Judge Bork found that no law expressly provides the
plaintiffs with a cause of action and that principles of separation of powers
counsels against the courts inferring a cause of action. Therefore, Judge
Bork concluded that the plaintiffs have no cause of action and that the suit
must be dismissed.6 7
Throughout his opinion, Judge Bork claimed that his guiding princi-
ple was the separation of powers; he believed that the "political" branches
of our government, the Executive and Legislative, should conduct U.S.
foreign relations. 68 In applying this principle, the courts should not hin-
der the Executive branch in foreign policy6 9 and should refrain from adju-
dicating matters that may embarrass the Executive branch in the
international community.70 Judge Bork counsels hesitation in matters
that may infringe upon the rightful duties of the Executive and Legislative
branches of government.7 1
Judge Bork proposed that the courts, in following the principle of
separation of powers, should not recognize a cause of action and should
refuse jurisdiction under the ATS.7 2 Although the primary defendant, the
PLO, was not a foreign sovereign, Judge Bork noted that the status of U.S.
foreign relations was still at stake73 because terrorism is a very sensitive
subject with very little international consensus. 74 Accordingly, the court
should have found no cause of action for this suit absent "a very clear
showing that [some body] of law grant[s the] appellants a cause of
action .... -75 Judge Bork noted that insufficient evidence of such a grant
existed. 76
ion, though persuasive, is beyond the scope of this Note. Id. at 823 (Robb, J.,
concurring).
For a discussion on Judge Robb's approach in Tel-Oren, see E. Hardy Smith, Note,
FederalJurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Can This Antiquated Statute Fulfill Its
Modem Role?, 27 Aiuz. L. REv. 437, 446 (1985).
66. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
67. Id. at 801.
68. Id. (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 197, 302 (1918)).
69. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 802 (quoting Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979)).
70. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 802 (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 697 (1976)).
71. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801.
72. Id. at 804.
73. Id. at 805.
74. Id. at 805-06.
75. Id. at 808.
76. Id.
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Judge Bork considered several bodies of law and found that none of
them granted the plaintiffs a cause of action. First, he considered treaties
entered into by the United States. According to Judge Bork, however,
treaties "do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable in
courts" 77 unless they are self-executing78 or there is legislation implement-
ing the treaty as domestic law.79 After examining the treaties cited by the
plaintiffs to support their claim, Judge Bork found that all of them were
non-self-executing and lacked authorizing legislation. 80
Second, Judge Bork considered and rejected U.S. federal common
law as a source of a cause of action.8 1 Judge Bork explained that "com-
mon law" had two meanings. First, common law meant the body of court-
made common law handed down from England and granting causes of
action.82 Second, common law meant the body of general law "not based
on a statute or constitution and not granting a cause of action."83 Accord-
ing to Judge Bork, to say that international law is a part of "federal com-
mon law' 8 4 refers to federal common law of the latter kind and does not
provide a cause of action.85 Therefore, a violation of international law,
which is a part of federal common law, does not.grant a cause of action
under the ATS.8 6
Third, Judge Bork considered federal statutes, specifically the "federal
question" statute and the ATS, but found that these provisions were purely
jurisdictional and that neither granted a cause of action.8 7 Judge Bork
argued that to interpret the ATS as providing a cause of action would
"make all United States treaties effectively self-executing."88 Moreover,
Judge Bork argued that appellants' interpretation was "too sweeping" and
would allow tort suits for infringement of "any international legal right."89
Finally, Judge Bork considered whether general international law,
standing alone, might create a cause of action. Traditionally, only states
are subjects of international law, not individuals; individuals have interna-
77. Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
78. A self-executing treaty is one that has effect as domestic law without further
legislation. Whether a treaty is self-executing depends on the intent of the United
States, i.e., the President when he ratifies it and the Congress when it gives its consent.
A self-executing treaty must be given the force of law in U.S. courts. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987).
79. Tel-Orn, 726 F.2d at 808.
80. Id. at 808-09.
81. Id. at 810.
82. Id. at 811. Examples of such common law would be the right to sue for tort or
contract.
83. Id.
84. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), stated that international law is a part
of the federal common law. Based on this statement, the appellants argued that a viola-
tion of international law would, not only provide jurisdiction under the ATS, but also
provide them with a cause of action. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810.
85. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 812.
89. Id.
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tional rights only to the extent that they derive them from the rights of
their respective countries.90 In addition, "as a general rule, international
law does not provide a private right of action [unless] demonstrated by
clear evidence that civilized nations had generally given their assent...."91
As Judge Bork could find no such evidence, 92 he concluded that appel-
lants had no cause of action.93
b. Judge Edwards: ATS does not extend to private actors
In Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards claimed to "adhere to the legal principles
established in Filartiga"94 Judge Edwards' formulation of the ATS paral-
lels the propositions established by the Filartiga opinion as he interpreted
them. First, "the 'law of nations' is not stagnant and should be construed
as it exists today among the nations of the world."95 Second, "one source
of that law is the customs and usages of civilized nations, as articulated by
jurists and commentators." 96 Third, "international law today places limits
on a state's power to torture persons held in custody, and confers 'funda-
mental rights upon all people' to be free from torture."97 And finally,
"[the ATS] opens the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already
recognized by international law."98
Judge Edwards first considered the plaintiff's "right to sue."99 Con-
trary to Judge Bork, Judge Edwards asserted that a plaintiff need not state
a separate cause of action to invoke ATSjurisdiction, but rather, in accord-
ance with the explicit language of the ATS, he need only show a violation
of international law.100 Furthermore, the ATS itself grants the plaintiff a
right to sue for violations of fundamental rights which international law
has endowed upon him.' 0 ' These violations include genocide, slavery,
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimina-
90. Id. at 817.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 817-19.
93. Id. at 819. In dismissing the action for lack of cause of action, Judge Bork did
not consider other issues surrounding the ATS, such as whether ATSjurisdiction could
be had over the PLO, an individual group not affiliated with a government, and
whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over the extraterritorial tort.
94. Id. at 776.
95. Id. at 777 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881).
96. Id. (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884).
97. Id. (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885).
98. Id. (citing Filartiga 630 F.2d at 887).
99. Id. The "right to sue," used by Judge Edwards, is synonymous to "cause of
action" as used by Judge Bork.
100. Judge Edwards states, "The language of the statute is explicit on this issue: by its
express terms, nothing more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke
section 1350." Id. at 779 (emphasis supplied).
101. Id. at 780. Judge Edwards derives this principle from Filartiga. He states:
The Second Circuit reads § 1350 "not as granting new rights to aliens, but sim-
ply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recog-
nized by international law." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887. I construe this phrase to
mean that aliens granted substantive rights under international law may assert
them under § 1350.
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don, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights.'0 2 A violation of any of these rights automatically
provides the victim with a statutory right under the ATS to sue for civil
damages in U.S. federal courts.
Judge Edwards then proposed an alternative formulation of the
ATSl 03 -that the violation of international law need not be of such monu-
mental importance as an infringement of a fundamental right. Rather,
ATS 'jurisdiction might be triggered by offenses less severe than are
required under the Filartiga formulation .... ,104 The international viola-
don, however, must have some minimal connection with a tort in violation
of domestic law. 10 5 The international violation and the domestic tort
could be the same ac 0 ° 6 but, at a minimum, there should be a "but for"
causation between the two, i.e., "but for" the international violation, the
domestic tort could not have been committed.10 7 Under this formulation,
the substantive right to sue would be based on the domestic tort law of the
United States. 10 8 In essence, the two elements for ATSjurisdiction under
Judge Edwards' formulation are a domestic tort and an allegation of a
violation of a less severe international law. 109
Id. at n.5.
102. Id. at 781. To identify such fundamental international rights, Judge Edwards
looked to the REsTATEMENT OF THE FORErGN RELATiONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
(REvISED) § 702 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). These fundamental rights were later
adopted into the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 702 (1987). Traditionally, crimes punishable as international violations
included violation of safe-conducts, infringement of diplomatic rights, and piracy. Tel-
Oren, 725 F.2d at 813. Crimes such as piracy and slave trade were labeled hostis humani
generis, an "enemy of all mankind" and were punishable by any state regardless of
nationality of the criminals or location of the crime. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 404 (1987). Filartiga has attempted to
add torture to this list of international crimes by creating civil liability, though not crim-
inal, for the violator.
103. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782.
104. Id. at 787.
105. Id. at 788.
106. Judge Edwards contemplates that his speculation that "the facts of Filartiga
would likely produce a finding of'jurisdiction under ... the... Adra formulation," is
evidence of proper jurisdiction. Id. The Adra formulation is identical to Judge
Edwards' alternative formulation. He presents the Adra court's rulings as a paradigm of
his proposition. For the brief facts of Adra, see supra note 13.
107. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788. Attempting to define "the requisite nexus between
the domestic and the international tort," Judge Edwards looks to the Adra decision
which "applied, at best, a 'but for' causation test to determine whether the international
and domestic torts were sufficiently related to establish jurisdiction." Id.
108. Id. at 782.
109. Judge Edwards, however, places some limitation on the use of the ATS in
accordance with the alternative formulation. He realizes that authorizing jurisdiction
over all matters satisiing the above two elements might "enable courts to burrow into
disputes wholly involving foreign states." To prevent this from happening, Judge
Edwards holds that his formulation should only cover the following situations: 1)
actions by "aliens for domestic torts that occur in the territory of the United States and
injure 'substantial rights' under international law," Id. at 788 (citing 26 Op. Att'y Gen.
250, 252-53 (1907)), 2) "for universal crimes, as under the first formulation," and 3) for
extraterritorial torts that are committed by U.S. citizens. Id.
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Although Judge Edwards found that the ATS granted the plaintiffs
the right to sue, he voted to dismiss the case because the primary defend-
ant, the PLO, was recognized -neither as a state nor as acting under color
of any recognized government."10 Private individuals are generally unable
to violate international law"' unless the violation is one of a listed excep-
tions.112 Judge Edwards found that terrorism could not be included
within one of the listed exceptions due to the lack of general consent on
the matter within the international community."13 He stated, "While this
nation unequivocally condemns all terrorists attacks, that sentiment is not
universal."114 Since terrorism is not an exception and the PLO, being
composed of private individuals, cannot violate international law, Judge
Edwards held that the courts do not have subject-matterjurisdiction under
the ATS.115
H. The Trajano Decision
A. The Facts
On August 31, 1977, Archimedes Trajano, a student at the Mapua Institute
of Technology, attended an open forum discussion at which Imee Marcos-
Manotoc"16 was scheduled to speak."17 At the discussion, Trajano ven-
tured to question Marcos-Manotoc regarding her appointment as director
of an organization. 1 8 The Philippine military intelligence subsequently
abducted Trajano, interrogated him, and tortured him to death.1 9
The military intelligence organization acted pursuant to martial law
declared by President Marcos and under the authority and orders of
Marcos, Marcos-Manotoc, and Fabian Ver.' 20 Marcos-Manotoc directly
controlled the police officers and military intelligence personnel who
abducted Trajano.' 21 She was aware that they tortured Trajano, and she
ultimately was the direct cause of Trajano's death.122
In February of 1986, a special presidential election culminated in the
election of Corazon Aquino, who displaced Marcos as president of the
110. Id. at 791.
111. Id. at 794.
112. Id. Such exceptions include piracy and, after Filartiga, torture. Id.
113. Id. at 795.
114. Id. He goes on to say that "the nations of the world are so divisively split on the
legitimacy of [terrorism] as to make it impossible to pin-point an area of... consensus."
Id.
115. Id. at 776.
116. Marcos-Manotoc was the daughter of Ferdinand Marcos, the President of the
Philippines at the time, and the National Chairman of the Kabataang Baranggay.
Trajano, 978 F.2d at 495.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 495-96.
120. Id. at 496. Fabian Ver was the director of the Philippine military intelligence,





1994 Adjudicating Violations of International Law
Philippines. 23 The situation at the presidential palace quickly deterio-
rated after the election and, consequently, endangered the lives of the
Marcoses. 124 U.S. Air Force helicopters air-lifted Marcos and his immedi-
ate family from the palace and transported them to Hickam Air Force Base
in Hawaii. 125
B. The District Court
Archimedes Trajano's mother, Agapita Trajano, a citizen of the Philip-
pines residing in Hawaii, filed suit against Marcos, Marcos-Manotoc, and
Ver in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on March
20, 1986.126 Seeking damages on behalf of the estate of Archimedes
Trajano, she alleged charges of false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful
death, and a deprivation of rights.127 She also sought damages for herself
for emotional distress.12 8
The Hawaiian district court held that subject-matter jurisdiction
existed under the ATS. 129 The defendants defaulted, and judgment was
entered against the defendants on May 29, 1986.130 The district court
eventually found' 3 ' that Marcos-Manotoc caused the torture and death of
Archimedes Trajano and, after a damages hearing, entered judgment for
the plaintiff in the amount of $4.16 million and attorneys' fees, in accord-
ance with Philippine law.' 3 2
123. Seth Mydans, Marcos Flees and Is Taken to Guam; U.S. Recognizes Aquino as Presi-
dent, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 26, 1986, at Al, A12.
124. Id.
125. Bernard Weinraub, Reagan Welcomes Change in Manila, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1986,
at Al, A15.





131. The district court did not reach this decision immediately. Marcos-Manotoc
eventually appeared before the court and moved to dismiss the action on several
grounds including the Act of State doctrine. She claimed that Trajano's death was an
act of the Philippine government and, as such, the federal courts of the United States
could not adjudicate the matter.
Judge Fong, presiding over the district court in Hawaii, accepted the defendant's
argument and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded. The court held that since "n] either the present government of the Repub-
lic of the Philippines nor the United States government objects to judicial resolution of
these claims, or sees any resulting potential embarrassment to any government[, t]he
issues raised . . . are within the capacity of the courts to resolve." Trajano, et al. v.
Marcos, et al., 878 F.2d 1439 (Table, Text in Westlaw), Unpublished Disposition (9th
Cir. July 10, 1989).
On remand, Marcos-Manotoc attempted to set aside the entry of default on the
ground that service was insufficient. The district court denied the motion. Trajano, 978
F.2d at 496.
132. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 496.
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C. The Ninth Circuit Rulings
Marcos-Manotoc appealed, claiming that the district court lacked author-
ity to enter a judgment since the court lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. 3 3 She argued that the FSIA, not the ATS, applied to this case and
that she was thus immune from suit.13 4 The Ninth Circuit rejected her
arguments and affirmed the judgment.'3 5
1. The FSIA Does Not Provide Sovereign Immunity to Marcos-Manotoc
The first step of the Ninth Circuit's analysis, as required by Amerada
Hess,' 36 was to determine whether the FSIA applied to Marcos-Manotoc.
The court noted, "The FSIA 'must be applied by the district courts in every
action against a foreign sovereign .... ,'137 The court determined that a
"foreign state," within the meaning of the FSIA, did not cover a defendant
in Marcos-Manotoc's situation (an individual acting outside of her official
capacity) 138 and therefore concluded that Marcos-Manotoc was not enti-
tled to immunity under the FSLA.139
Clarifying the definition of a "foreign state" given by the FSIA, 140 the
Ninth Circuit has previously included individuals acting within their offi-
cial capacity.' 4 ' As a corollary, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the FSIA
does not provide immunity for officials acting outside of their official
capacities.142 This includes officials acting completely outside their
133. Id. at 499.
134. Id. at 497.
135. Id. at 501.
136. See discussion supra part I.A.
137. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 496 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 493 (1983)).
138. Id. at 497.
139. Id. at 498.
140. The FSIA, in relevant part, provides:
For purposes of this chapter-
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof...
and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created
under the laws of any third country.
FSIA § 1603(a), (b).
141. In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990), the
court decided to "join the majority of the courts which have similarly concluded that
section 1603(b) can fairly be read to include individuals sued in their official capacity."
As examples of other courts which have followed this line of reasoning, the court pro-
vided several cases from other districts including Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) and American Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 653 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. 111. 1987). Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103.
142. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106. The Ninth Circuit stated in Trajano that "[in
Chuidian, we held that the FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official capacity,
but that an official is not entitled to immunity for acts which are not committed in an
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authorized capacities 143 and officials claiming to act as an individual and
not as an official. 144
Despite this broad definition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Marcos-Manotoc could not be categorized within the scope of a "foreign
state."14 5 Although an official of the Philippine government, she admitted
that she was acting on her individual authority and not on the authority of
the government. 146 The court ruled, therefore, that the district court did
not err in sustaining the jurisdiction over Marcos-Manotoc in her individ-
ual capacity.147
2. The ATS Confers Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over the Action
The Ninth Circuit determined that the ATS requires three elements to
confer jurisdiction on federal courts: "a claim by an alien, a tort, and a
violation of international law."' 48 These requirements were fulfilled by
this case: the plaintiff was an alien, torture and wrongful death are tort
claims, and torture violates international law149 as evidenced by various
international declarations.' 5 0 The court also cited judicial determinations
in finding that international law prohibits torture.151
In challenging the court's jurisdiction, Marcos-Manotoc attacked the
scope of the ATS, asserting that it does not cover every situation in which
the court's three elements are fulfilled. She claimed that the ATS does
official capacity... and for acts beyond the scope of her authority." Trajano, 978 F.2d
at 497.
143. Clarifying this category, the Chuidian court stated, "If an employee of the
United States acts completely outside his governmental authority, he has no immunity.
An obvious example would be ... sale of... personal [property]." Chuidian, 912 F.2d at
1106 (quoting United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987)).
144. Clarifying this category, the Chuidian court stated, "If the officer purports to act
as an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against that action is not a suit
against the sovereign." Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949)).
145. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 498.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 499.
149. Id.
150. The plaintiff cited various treaties which prohibit torture as a violation of inter-
national law. These include the United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948); the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S.
1, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. 4 v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975); the Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N.
GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975); and the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, GA. Res. 39/46, U.N. CAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), repinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
151. The court stated, "And, as we have recently held, 'it would be unthinkable to
conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary international law.'"
Trajano, 978 F.2d at 499 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)). See also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 ("[We find that an act of
torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.").
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not confer jurisdiction over a tort committed by a foreign state's agents
against its nationals outside of the United States and having no nexus to
this country.15 2 She also claimed that the violation of international law
must be recognized by U.S. federal law and that a violation of interna-
tional law, standing alone, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 153 The
Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. 54
Marcos-Manotoc first argued that the Senate's understanding
attached to its ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment155-conditioning that a state is not required to provide a private
right of action for extraterritorial torture-suggests that international law
cannot provide a right of action against torture outside of the plaintiff's
country.' 5 6 The court found this inference to be incorrect, however,
because the understanding does not prohibit U.S. courts from providing a
forum for claims by aliens for extraterritorial torture, a transitory tort.157
Second, Marcos-Manotoc argued that the Justice Department's
change in position, as evidenced by their amicus curiae brief, advocating
jurisdiction only where violation of international law is recognized and
made a part of federal law,158 made jurisdiction here inappropriate. 159
The court stated that the Justice Department's "change of position in dif-
ferent cases and by different administrations is not a definitive statement
by which we are bound on the limits of [the ATS]."' 60 The court held that
these actions by the legislative and executive branches did not change the
law established by Filartiga'61 and that the ATS provides proper jurisdic-
tion over official torture claims in violation of international law regardless
of the "citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury."16 2
152. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 499.
153. Id. at 499-500.
154. Id. at 500.
155. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). According to the United States
Senate, "it is the understanding of the United States that Article 14 requires a State
Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed
in territory under thejurisdiction of that State Party." 136 CONG. REc. S17486 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990).
156. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 499-500.
157. Id, at 500.
158. Id. In its memorandum as Amicus Curiae submitted in Trajano, the U.S. Justice
Department advocated that ATS jurisdiction should be limited only to those situations
where 1) the tortfeasor was subject to U.S. jurisdiction at the time he committed the
tort, 2) the United States would be held accountable for the action, 3) a federal crimi-
nal statute defines the conduct as an offense against the law of nations, and 4) the
.federal statute provides a private right of action. Cole et al., supra note 10, at 3.
159. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 500.
160. Id.
161. See discussion supra part I.B.1.
162. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 500.
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3. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Conferred upon District Courts by the ATS Is Not
Violative of Article Iff
Marcos-Manotoc then asserted that jurisdiction under the ATS was consti-
tutionally invalid because the Constitution does not authorize Congress to
confer such jurisdiction on federal courts. 163 The Ninth Circuit, however,
found that the "arising under" clause 164 of the Constitution gives Congress
this authority.1 65
The court agreed with Marcos-Manotoc that a purely jurisdictional
statute authorized by the "arising under" clause "may not alone confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts, and that the rights of the parties must
stand or fall on federal substantive law to pass constitutional muster."16 6
The court also conceded that the rights of these parties depended on fed-
eral substantive law.167 Nevertheless, the court found that relevant and
substantive federal law was involved and thus validated jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit found that the reasoning of Verlinden B. V v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria,'68 in which the Supreme Court held jurisdiction under
the FSIA constitutionally valid under the "arising under" clause, 16 9 also
applied to the ATS so that its jurisdiction was also constitutionally valid.17 0
In Verlinden, the court found that "Congress has the undisputed power to
decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what circumstances
foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States."' 7 1
Accordingly, "a suit against a foreign state... necessarily raises questions
of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence clearly 'arises
under' federal law, as that term is used in Art. III."'
1 7 2
The Ninth Circuit extended this reasoning to validate not only juris-
diction over foreign sovereigns, but also jurisdiction over foreign govern-
ment officials acting under color of law.' 7- The court cited various
sources from the framers of the Constitution suggesting that the "arising
under" clause would validate jurisdiction over any foreign individual even
if no connection between the individual and the sovereign existed.174
163. Id. at 501.
164. The "arising under" clause of the Constitution, in relevant part, provides:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;, -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; ....
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
165. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 501.
166. Id. (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989)).
167. Id.
168. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1982).
169. Id. at 492.
170. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 501.
171. Verlindsn, 461 U.S. at 493.
172. Id.
173. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 501-02.
174. Id. at 502. Among the sources cited by the Ninth Circuit were THE FEDERAusT
No. 80, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Arising under" clause was applica-
ble to "all those [cases] in which [foreigners] are concerned....") and Letter fromJames
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Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit proposed that "the law of nations is a
part of federal common law."175 Under this approach, Congress may con-
stitutionally confer jurisdiction upon federal courts over any action which
could involve international law since any such case would also involve fed-
eral law. Since the ATS concerns foreign plaintiffs and international law,
congressionally conferred jurisdiction is proper. 176
4. A Separate, Independent Cause of Action Is Necessary
Finally, Marcos-Manotoc argued that even if the ATS conferred jurisdic-
tion over the matter, jurisdiction existed only to determine whether the
plaintiff had a separate, substaritive cause of action. 17 7 In other words,
Trajano must also find an independent cause of action created by a sepa-
rate and substantive body of law. s7 8 Since no treaty or customary interna-
tional law creates such a positive right to bring action, Marcos-Manotoc
asserted that the action must be dismissed.' 79
The district court agreed that the ATS is merely a jurisdictional stat-
ute and creates no cause of action standing alone.1 80 Nevertheless, the
district court proceeded to find a cause of action, not in treaties or inter-
national law, but in the substantive law of the Philippine Civil Code, and
calculated damages under Philippine law.' 8 '
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this interpretation of the ATS. Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the ATS is only ajurisdictional stat-
ute providing courts with subject-matter jurisdiction. It does not create a
cause of action for the plaintiff. The court ruled that the violation of
international law only "supplies the jurisdictional key to [a] federal
court,"182 i.e., it is relevant as an element of jurisdiction but irrelevant in
determining the right to a remedy. The court ruled that "the cause of
action comes from municipal tort law and not from the law of nations or
treaties of the Untied States."' 8 3
Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERs oFJAMEs MADIsON 368,
370 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds., 1975) ("Arising under" clause extends judicial pow-
ers to "all cases which concern foreigners.").
175. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 502 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
and United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)).
176. Id. at 502-03. See also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 ("The constitutional basis for the
Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal com-
mon law.").
177. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503.
178. The Justice Department went another step and advocated that the separate
cause of action must be recognized by Congress and enacted as a part of domestic
federal law. Cole et al., supra note 10, at 3.
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M. Analysis
A. Cause of Action in an ATS Suit
The most controversial issue regarding the ATS is whether the statute cre-
ates a cause of action. The issue breaks down into two separate questions.
First, must the plaintiff have a cause of action for the courts to properly
take jurisdiction over ATS cases? Second, does the cause of action which
entities the plaintiff to ajudicial remedy arise from the ATS or some other
source?
1. Cause of Action Is Not Needed to Invoke ATS Jurisdiction
In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork held that the plaintiff needed to show an
independent cause of action before the courts could take proper jurisdic-
tion over the action.' 8 4 Judge Bork misconstrues the statute and creates
an additional requirement which is not in the statutory language or the
legislative history.
Judge Edwards, concurring in Tel-Oren and rejecting Judge Bork's
additional requirement, asserted:
The Second Circuit [in Filartiga] did not require plaintiffs to point to a spe-
cific right to sue ... in order to establish jurisdiction under [the ATS];
rather, the Second Circuit required only a showing that the defendant's
actions violated the substantive law of nations...-. Judge Bork's suggestion
that [the ATS] requires plaintiffs to allege a right to sue ... is seriously
flawed.' 8 5
The Filartiga court distinguished between two stages of proceedings -one
where the court finds jurisdiction to hear the case and one where the
court determines if a cause of action exists. 186 When the defendant
argued that there was no cause of action, much as Marcos-Manotoc did
.and Judge Bork would have, the Filartiga court explained:
In doing so, [the defendant] confuses the question of federal jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute, which requires consideration of the law of
nations, with the issue of the choice of law to be applied, which will be
addressed at a later stage in the proceedings. The two issues are distinct.
187
The Filartiga court explains that, in order for the court to obtain jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, it only needs to consider whether international law
was violated, not whether international or any other law provides a cause
of action. This analysis is supported by the language of the ATS, which
only requires a violation of international law.18 8 Judge Edwards adopts
this well supported position and holds that a showing of an independent
184. Tel-Orenz, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
186. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Judge Edwards stated:
The language of the statute is explicit on this issue: by its express terms, noth-
ing more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section
1350. Judge Bork nevertheless would propose to write into section 1350 an
additional restriction that is not even suggested by the statutory language.
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cause of action is not required for the plaintiff to invoke the ATS and for
the courts to take jurisdiction over the case. 189
The Trajano court, following the Filartiga court and Judge Edwards'
reasoning, correctly resolved this issue. While conceding that some sub-
stantive federal law was constitutionally necessary for the court to take
proper jurisdiction under the ATS, 190 the Ninth Circuit did not require
that the substantive law be a cause of action. Rather, the court held that a
simple claim of an international law violation sufficiently implicates sub-
stantive federal law. Since only individuals acting under official authority
or under color of authority can violate international law,' 9 1 and proceed-
ings against such persons necessarily involve sovereign immunity, an area
regulated by federal law,192 a claim of international law violation always
implicates substantive federal law. 'Consequently, an ATS claim is always
sufficient to justify jurisdiction.
2. ATS Does Not Create a Cause of Action
Although a cause of action may be unnecessary for a court to exercise
jurisdiction over an ATS case, one is necessary for the court to grant the
plaintiff a remedy. Whether the ATS creates a cause of action is highly
disputed, with respectable judges and commentators on both sides of the
dispute.' 93 After examination of this issue, the Trajano court correctly
concluded that the ATS "is simply a jurisdictional statute and creates no
cause of action itself."19 4
BothJudge Edwards' 95 and the Amicus Curiae Memorandum, written
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 777.
190. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 501 (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989)).
See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
191. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 501-02.
192. Id. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
193. Included among those asserting that the ATS does create a cause of action are
the following- Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777-82 (Edwards,
J., concurring); The Forti court, 672 F. Supp. at 1539 ("There appears to be a growing
consensus that section 1350 provides a cause of action..."); David Cole et al., Amicus
Curiae Memorandum on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Sup-
port of Plaintiffs in Trajano v. Marcos, [hereinafter Amicus Memo), reprinted in David
Cole et al., Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memorandum of International
Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HASTNGS INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 1,
20-33 (1988); and Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a
Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 473, 480 (1986) (Professor Randall, how-
ever, does not unconditionally claim that the ATS creates a cause of action. Rather, he
states that "the Alien Tort Statute therefore suggests the existence of a cause of action-
or permission to invoke the district court's power-where a plaintiff simply establishes
that defendant committed a municipal tort and a violation of the law of nations or a
treaty.") (first emphasis added).
In contrast, the following judges and commentators hold otherwise: Casto, supra
note 11, at 479; Crockett, supra note 51, at 33-42; Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit, Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 798; and, after Trajano, the Ninth Circuit.
194. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503.
195. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
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by international law scholars and practitioners for the Trajano case,' 96
(Amicus Memo), advocated the theory that the ATS creates a cause of
action. These arguments, however, are based on misinterpretations and
unsupported assertions. In support of his position, Judge Edwards first
pointed to the Filartiga decision.' 9 7 As discussed above,198 however, the
Filartiga court did not hold that the ATS creates a cause of action. Judge
Edwards also looked' 9 9 to a 1907 opinion of U.S. Attorney General Bona-
parte,20 0 who stated that the ATS "provide[s] a right of action and a
forum.'" 20 ' But this 1907 opinion does not provide any analysis nor does it
cite any authority for its bold, but unsupported statement. As one com-
mentator stated, "The 1907 Opinion is purely conclusory."20 2
Alternatively, the Amicus Memo looked to legislative history and
determined that Congressional understanding was "that transitory torts
were indeed actionable, and were directly actionable in federal court
.... "203 But Professor William Casto, by looking at the language of the
statute, provides a different interpretation of Congressional intent:
The statute is purely jurisdictional, and the first Congress undoubtedly
understood this to be the case. The Alien Tort Claim Act... simply gave
the district courts "cognizance" . . . . Eighteenth century lawyers under-
stood this term of art as referring to a court's power to try a case. When the
first Congress desired to create statutory civil actions, entirely different lan-
guage was used.204
Professor Casto's language based argument effectively renders a claim that
the ATS creates a private cause of action as "simply frivolous." 20 5
3. Alternative Sources of Cause of Action
Since the ATS does not create a private cause of action, an independent
source is necessary for the courts to provide the plaintiff a remedy. Courts
and commentators have looked to two sources of law for the necessary
cause of action: international law and local municipal law. The Trajano
court rejected the first source and looked to the second.
a. International law as a source of a cause of action
In Trajano, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to find
the necessary cause of action in municipal tort law and not the law of
196. Amicus Memo, supra note 193, at 20-33.
197. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780.
198. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
199. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780.
200. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907).
201. Id. at 252.
202. Crockett, supra note 51, at 37. Professor Casto, agreeing with this position and
summarily dismissing the Attorney General's opinion, states, "Notwithstanding a care-
lessly written attorney general's opinion, section 1350 clearly does not create a statutory
cause of action. The statute is purelyjurisdictional.. .. " Casto, supra note 11, at 478-79
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
203. Amicus Memo, supra note 193, at 25.
204. Casto, supra note 11, at 479 (footnotes omitted).
205. Id. at 480.
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nations or treaties of the United States.20 6 This ruling is supported by
traditional international law, which holds that states, not individuals, are
the proper subjects of international law.20 7 International law is concerned
with "the rights and obligations of nation-states inter se, rather than with
the rights of private individuals."20 Accordingly, individuals do not have
"legal personality" in international law and "as a general rule, interna-
tional law does not provide a private right of action .... -209
This view is shared by several commentators who suggest, "There is
serious doubt ... whether international law, unassisted by domestic law,
creates a tort remedy that may be invoked in domestic courts by private
individuals."2 10 The lack of a body of international law or precedent
allowing for such an international private cause of action does not, in
itself, prove that international law cannot create a cause of action. New
situations, however, such as a suit for torture, would lead to judicial crea-
tion of purported "international law" by analogy to domestic law.2 11 With
the ATS, the newly created law would not be international law, but a rendi-
tion of American law: "Such a cause of action would be an international
remedy in name only."2 12 Similarly, treaties do not generally create a pri-
vate cause of action unless there is specific language to that effect.2 13 In
general, international law is a very tenuous source from which to derive a
cause of action.
b. Local law as a source of a cause of action-Rules of decision
approach
In Trajano, the district court determined damages in accordance with Phil-
ippine law.214 The Trajano court's action was preceded by the Filartiga
court which assessed damages, in part, according to the laws of Paraguay.
Although courts have not recognized their action for what it actually is,
the utilized basis of recovery in these precedent cases exemplify the rules
of decision approach to a cause of action.
Filartiga first hinted at this approach by distinguishing two phases in
the proceedings: findingjurisdiction and deciding the rules of decision to
be applied. 2 15 Under the rules of decision approach, finding a private
cause of action is governed by a choice of law analysis, i.e., determining
which laws will govern the substantive issues of the case and using those
laws to determine the existence of a cause of action and appropriate rem-
206. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503.
207. See generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816-20 (Bork, J., concurring).
208. Crockett, supra note 51, at 41.
209. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 817 (Bork, J., concurring).
210. Casto, supra note 11, at 475. Professor Crockett agrees: "It is doubtful, however,
that customary international law would provide a private cause of action in Alien Tort
Statute cases." Crockett, supra note 51, at 40.
211. Casto, supra note 11, at 476-77.
212. Id. at 477.
213. Crockett, supra note 51, at 41-42.
214. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503.
215. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
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edy.2 16 Federal courts should use federal common law to determine
which substantive law will apply to the different issues in the case.
Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and possible remedy will
depend on the result of the choice of rule analysis. In cases like Filartiga
and Trajano, the United States has little interest in having its own laws
applied and all the relevant contacts are with the foreign state. Conse-
quently, the proper law to determine the rights of the parties is the foreign
local law. For special issues, such as punitive damages, the courts can
again use federal common law to determine which law will determine
whether punitive damages are appropriate. For example, the Filartiga
court, on finding that Paraguayan law did not award punitive damages,
held that such damages would still be appropriate under both U.S. and
international arbitration decisions.21 7
B. The Scope of ATS Jurisdiction
The Trajano court held that if the three ATS elements are satisfied, federal
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.21 8 The court
imposed no limits on the scope of the ATS but left open-ended, and
potentially unlimited, the proper extent of ATS jurisdiction. The lan-
guage of the ATS provides no clear solution to this problem. On the con-
trary, the "plain language of the Alien Tort Statute authorizes jurisdiction
over 'any' alien's action for a tort in violation of international law, whoever
the tortfeasor may be and wherever the tort may have occurred .... " 2 19
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of constraints, ATS jurisdiction
must be limited. To construe the ATS as "without limits would vest U.S.
courts with a free-roving commission to intermeddle in foreign domestic
activities throughout the world."220 Even if such an extension ofjurisdic-
tion could be enforced,2 2 ' this unlimited exercise of U.S. authority would
violate both the Constitution 2 22 and internationally recognized principles
ofjurisdiction. 2 23 This section considers the proper scope and limitations
of ATS jurisdiction.
216. See generally, Crockett, supra note 51, at 46-50; Casto, supra note 11, at 473-88;
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 97-103.
217. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 865.
218. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 499.
219. Amicus Memo, supra note 193, at 17.
220. Casto, supra note 11, at 472 n.33. Even the authors of the Amicus Memo, who
advocate the broadest reading of the ATS concede that some limitation on ATSjurisdic-
tion is necessary. "This does not mean, of course, that every tort somehow connected to
an international law violation would proceed to judgment in a federal court. There are
substantial procedural limitations on such suits .... " Amicus Memo, supra note 193, at
17 n.55.
221. Casto, supra note 11, at 472 n.33. "This arrogation of authority would be futile
to the extent that the United States lacks power to enforce suchjudgments." Professor
Cast6 continues, "Uncontrolled litigation could also impede the conduct of foreign
relations, including the implementation of human rights." Id.
222. See discussion infra part III.B.2.c.
223. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
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1. Proper Defendants of the ATS Actions
Determining who is liable for suit under the ATS is very controversial. 224
Private plaintiffs have invoked the ATS to bring suits against a variety of
defendants, 2 25 but the precise boundaries of proper defendants under the
ATS are still in dispute.
Amerada Hess held that the ATS cannot serve as the sole basis ofjuris-
diction over a foreign sovereign. 226 The next analytical step asks to what
extent and in what circumstances are private individuals subject to suit
under the ATS.
a. Individuals acting under color of law
In Trajano, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Filartiga by holding that a private
individual acting under the color of law is subject to jurisdiction under the
ATS.22 7 But this simple answer does not consider an inherent problem-
that most individuals acting under the color of law are also considered a
"foreign state" for the purposes of the FSIA228 and, consequently, are gen-
erally immune from suit. Since FSIA immunity must be determined
before the question of proper ATS jurisdiction, if an individual acting
under color of law is immune under the FSIA, the question of proper
jurisdiction under the ATS will never even arise. Since the FSIA would
exclude most potential defendants before ATSjurisdiction is even consid-
ered, to simply state that persons acting under the color of law are proper
defendants under the ATS would leave the ATS applicable to practically
no defendants at all and render the ATS obsolete. The Ninth Circuit's
Trajano decision suggests a solution to this FSIA hurdle.
In finding that Marcos-Manotoc was not a "foreign state" under the
FSIA but was sufficiently associated with the government to have violated
224. Many commentators and judges have considered this very question. Randall,
supra note 193, at 495; Janney, supra note 24, at 368; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95
(Edwards, J., concurring); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428 (1989).
225. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (suit brought against a foreign sovereign); Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d 774 (suit brought against the Arabian government and the P.L.O., a private
organization); Nguyen DaYen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (suit brought
against the Immigration and Naturalization Service and private corporations incorpo-
rated in America); Lopez v. Reederei Richard Schroeder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa.
1963) and Adra, 195 F. Supp. 857 (suits brought against private individuals).
226. See supra part I.A. Also, Randall, supra note 193, at 507-11 ("The Alien Tort
Statute does not provide an exception to the law of sovereign immunity." "[T]he Alien
Tort Statute ... provides at most a concurrent basis of jurisdiction.").
227. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 498.
228. Many courts have included an official acting within his official capacity within
the definition of "foreign state." Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank 912 F.2d 1095,
1099-1103 (9th Cir. 1990); Week v. Cayman Islands, No. 91-2965, 1992 WL 372241, at 3
(7th Cir. Dec. 16, 1992) (unpublished disposition) ("The individual defendants in this
action are sued in their official capacities. As instrumentalities of the foreign sovereign
they are the same as the sovereign for purposes of immunity."); Fickling v. Common-
wealth of Australia, 775 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Plaintiffs... bring the above-
referenced action against defendants... Tony Lyons, in his official capacity .... Lyons
is an "agency or instrumentality" of Australia under the [FSIA]."); Rios v. Marshall, 530
F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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the prohibition against official torture, the Ninth Circuit drew a fine line
between the FSIA and the ATS. To reach this conclusion, the court
looked to an earlier decision, Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,2 29
which held that the FSIA does not immunize government officials for acts
not committed in an official capacity or for acts beyond the scope of the
official's authority.230 By creating a new and non-enumerated "exception"
to sovereign immunity, Chuidian provided the key to extending ATSjuris-
diction to government officials.
To overcome sovereign immunity, a plaintiff need only show that the
official's action, although purportedly taken in performance of her duties,
was actually beyond the scope of her power. If the act is torture, an act
which no government will publicly condone, the plaintiff's burden is mini-
mal. 23 ' With this court-created exception, the Ninth Circuit has con-
strued the FSIA to allow room for the ATS to take jurisdiction over
government officials. This construction allows a plaintiff to bring suit
against an official who committed a tort in violation of international law
and who, otherwise, would be immune from suit.
b. Private individuals
Although Trajano did not directly address whether private individuals
could be proper defendants in ATS cases, the inquiry is relevant since it
may be the next issue for the courts to resolve. Including individuals as
defendants in ATS actions is problematic since, traditionally, individuals
cannot violate international law23 2 as required by the ATS. If individuals
cannot violate international law, they can never be subject to ATS
jurisdiction.
Professor Kenneth Randall suggests that in "certain circumstances,
however, 'actions based on international law violations may also be
brought against individuals who in one capacity or another had commit-
ted acts prohibited by international law."' 23 3 Such circumstances include
cases where Congress provides for criminal or civil statutory liability and
cases of genocide, which are always enforceable against private or official
entities.23 4 Professor Randall proposes that, despite traditional ideas of
international law, individuals sometimes have obligations and duties
under international law and should be liable for violations of international
norms. Whether a private individual has responsibilities under an interna-
tional norm is dependent on whether the norm is "intended to provide a
229. Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
230. Id. at 1106.
231. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 106 ("[I]ndividual defendants in cases
like Filartiga, where states may have an interest in denying that the actors were acting as
agents of their government, would almost certainly not be covered by the FSIA.").
232. Randall, supra note 193, at 497 ("[I]ndividuals and other non-state actors pur-
portedly do not have rights under international law neither do they have duties; hence,
they cannot violate international law.").
233. Id. at 497 (citing 0. SCHACHER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AN PRACTIcE
238-39 (1985)).
234. Id. at 497-99.
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basis for claims against individual actors."23 5 Hence, individuals should be
held liable for a violation of the prohibition against genocide, a norm
which contemplates "holding individuals responsible when acting in either
a private or an official capacity."23 6
Although Professor Randall distinguishes private individuals from pri-
vate corporations and non-state organizations, such as the P.L.O., 23 7 this
author would generalize this approach and apply it to every category of
potential defendants, from private individuals to sovereign states. Predi-
cating an entity's ability to violate an international norm upon the defini-
tion of that norm, is a clear and universally applicable approach. For
example, only states could violate an international norm prohibiting war,
but both states and individuals acting under color of law could violate a
norm prohibiting official torture. Assuming arguendo that terrorism was
generally accepted as contrary to international law, then non-state organi-
zations such as the P.L.O. could violate the norm. Individuals could also
violate such international norms as an offense against ambassadors238 or
falsifying a passport.239 Using this approach, the courts would have a clear
and easily applicable rule to determine whether an ATS defendant could
conceivably violate the alleged international law and whether ATSjurisdic-
tion is proper in that situation.
2. Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Activities
Another important ATS controversy is its jurisdiction over extraterritorial
activities. This problem has increased since the most recent ATS cases,
including Trajano, have involved almost no nexus with the United States.
The majority of the suits have been between two aliens240 for activities
occurring outside of U.S. borders.24 1
a. Classical international principles counseling against extension of
ATS jurisdiction over extraterritorial torts
Several principles of classical international law dictate that U.S. courts
should abstain from hearing ATS cases with minimal nexus to the United
States. One of the oldest and well established principles of international
law is a state's inviolable right to territorial sovereignty, which provides
that all events occurring within the territory of a state are a matter of
domestic jurisdiction and the sole concern of that state, and no other state
235. Id. at 499.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 497-507.
238. One example is the "Marbois incident" which, with several other concerns, orig-
inally inspired the ATS. See Randall, supra note 4, at 24-26.
239. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
240. Casto, supra note 11, at 511 n.244 and accompanying text.
241. See Randall, supra note 4, at 59 n.289 and accompanying text. Extraterritorial
application of the ATS is especially problematic in light of the extreme likeliness that
the drafters of the statute did not intend or contemplate its invocation for extraterrito-
rial events, except in a limited number of situations. Id. at 60-62.
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shall have an interest or a right to interfere. 242 Under strict compliance
with territorial sovereignty, U.S. courts should not be allowed to adjudi-
cate events that took place within the territory of another state between
nationals of that state.
The international community, however, has not adhered strictly to
the principle of territorial sovereignty. The recognition of human rights,
developed since World War II, has provided states with a legitimate reason
to intervene in matters occurring wholly within a foreign state's terri-
tory.2 4 3 The deterioration of strict territorial sovereignty244 may provide
U.S. courts with authority to adjudicate extraterritorial torts that rise to
the level of violations of fundamental human rights.
245
Comity is a second international principle that advises against adjudi-
cation of extraterritorial torts. Under comity principles, one state may
comply with or defer to the laws of another state out of courtesy and good
will. 246 Comity may also require that forum courts refrain from adjudicat-
ing matters occurring in foreign states, thus allowing that state's justice
system to resolve these situations. 247
International comity, however, should not apply to ATS cases for
three reasons. First, comity has never required that forum courts com-
pletely refrain from adjudicating cases with no direct contact with the
forum state.2 48 Second, comity is generally applied to criminal cases and
not civil cases.249 Third, the general rule of comity has deteriorated in
light of the increasing persuasive influence of human rights norms.250 For
these reasons, comity does not oppose the U.S. courts' exercise of ATS
jurisdiction.
b. Principles justifying extraterritorial exercise of ATS jurisdiction
Several principles justify exercising jurisdiction over extraterritorial events.
One of the oldest and well established of these principles is the common
law doctrine of transitory torts. The Trajano court, as did the Filartiga
court, looked to the transitory tort doctrine to obtain jurisdiction over an
extraterritorial event.
251
242. See U.N. CHrRTFR art. 2, 7 (guarantees its members territorial sovereignty stat-
ing, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
243. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 77.
244. Commentators have asserted that the international community adheres to terri-
torial sovereignty only to the extent that there is a general consensus. The community's
conception of matters within domestic jurisdiction may change with time. Id. ("The
issue of domestic versus international concern depends ultimately on how the interna-
tional community chooses to define the matter.")
245. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85.
246. BLAcCK's LAw DIaIoNARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
247. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 83-84.
248. Id. at 84.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503; Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
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The transitory tort doctrine provides that "the tortfeasor's wrongful
acts create an obligation which follows him across national boundaries."252
The plaintiff may bring suit for the tort wherever he may find the
tortfeasor 25 3 as long as the suit is not strongly contrary to the public policy
of the forum state. 254 U.S. federal courts, invoking the transitory tort doc-
trine, may properly take jurisdiction of extraterritorial torts as long as Con-
gress confers original jurisdiction. Since the ATS confers such
jurisdiction, federal courts may properly take jurisdiction over wrongful
death suits or other transitory torts.
Providing the federal courts as an alternative forum for aliens to bring
suit255 effectuates the purposes of the ATS, i.e., to promote unbiased judg-
ments25 6 and avoid friction in international relations.257 The transitory
torts doctrine not only justifies ATS jurisdiction, but almost necessitates it
to ensure that federal courts, not state courts, hear cases that could affect
U.S. foreign relations.
In addition to the transitory tort doctrine, internationally accepted
bases of jurisdiction to prescribe laws258 may authorize jurisdiction to
adjudicate extraterritorial activities. 259 Of the five260 bases ofjurisdiction
252. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 63.
253. Amicus Memo, supra note 193, at 14.
254. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 63.
255. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 ("There is evidence ... that the intent of this section
was to assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishan-
dled by a state court, might blossom into an international crisis.").
256. Burley, supra note 14, at 465 ("The Federalists thought this danger [of the
denial ofjustice to an alien party] to be particularly great in state courts."); Tel-Oren, 726
F.2d at 782 (The ATS was a result of "[c]oncern that state courts might deny justice to
aliens . . ").
257. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782; Casto, supra note 11, at 489-98; Burley, supra note 14,
at 465 (The ATS is a result of "the Framer's desire to avoid embroiling the nation in
conflicts with foreign states arising from U.S. mistreatment of foreign citizens.").
258. International law has developed five bases which give a state jurisdiction to pre-
scribe. For a summary of the five, see J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 202-35, (10th ed. 1989). These principles authorize a state to create and possibly
enforce laws regulating certain situations, persons, or activities. They provide mecha-
nisms by which power is distributed among the members of the international commu-
nity. Although not every state recognizes the validity of all five principles, the U.S.
accepts all of them and has a history of practicing them to its extremes. E.g., The Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988) (declaring illegal and imposing criminal liability for
contracts that restrains "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations" without limitation on where the contract is executed); Compagnie
Europ6enne des Petroles S.L v. Sensor Nederland B.V., 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983) (the Dis-
trict Court in the Hague Judgment, in the Netherlands, invalidating the United States'
attempt to regulate international trade of technology based on origin or "nationality" of
the technology).
259. Ifa state has a proper basis ofjurisdiction to prescribe laws, it may have jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate or enforce its laws if the enforcement measures are reasonably
related to the laws and the punishment is reasonably proportional to the act. RESTATE.
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES § 431 (1987).
Most commentators recognize two categories of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe
and jurisdiction to enforce. In contrast, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
recognize three categories, the two above and a third, jurisdiction to adjudicate.
RESTATEMENT (THim) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
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to prescribe, the protective and universal principles may justify ATS
jurisdiction.
In accordance with the protective principle, a state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law regarding conduct against state security or against other lim-
ited and vital state interests, including the integrity of government func-
tions and the state's vital economic interests. 2 61 The protective principle
justifies extension of ATS jurisdiction because its invocation always impli-
cates U.S. foreign relations.2 62 The United States' authority to exercise
power under the protective principle must include "the nation's ability to
make and implement foreign policy in an effective manner."26 3
The Filartiga court relied on the principle of universal jurisdiction to
prescribe in stating that "the torturer has become-like the pirate and
slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all man-
kind."264 Universaljurisdiction allows a state to define and prescribe pun-
ishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern. Such offenses are considered contrary to the interests
of the international community-"a heinous threat to the common
safety."265 As a matter of customary law, any and all states may claim juris-
diction over such acts, regardless of where or by whom the act was commit-
ted. This doctrine was formerly applied principally to piracy,2 66 but could
also apply to other offenses such as slave trade2 67 and genocide. 268
(1987). Under the two category system, the jurisdiction to adjudicate would be
included in jurisdiction to enforce. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Part IV Introductory Note (1987).
260. The five bases ofjurisdiction are: 1) territorial jurisdiction, which gives a state
authority to prescribe laws over acts within its own territory (this includes the effects
doctrine, which states that any act that has any effect in the forum state has jurisdiction
to prescribe laws over such activities); 2) nationality principle, which allows jurisdiction
over actions of a state's citizens; 3) protective principle, which allows states to exercise
jurisdiction over crimes against its security, integrity of governmental function, or its
vital economic interests; 4) passive personality principle, which allows states jurisdiction
over actions where its victims are nationals of that state; 5) universal jurisdiction, which
allows any state to prescribe punishment for certain specific crimes which are recog-
nized by the community of nations as of universal concern and contrary to the interest
of the international community as a whole. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF rH FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, 404 (1987).
261. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(3) (1987). For more detail about protective jurisdiction, see generally George D.
Brown, Beyond Pennhurst- ProtectiveJurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of
Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REv. 343
(1985).
262. Casto, supra note 11, at 513.
263. Id.
264. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
265. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 60.
266. Id. (citing United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); United
States v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820)).
267. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (D. Mass. 1821) (No. 13,819).
268. The Nuremberg trials. SeeJudgment of the International Military Tribunal, 22
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Militay Tribuna Proceedings 411,
(1948), reprinted in 41 AM.J. INT'L L. 172 (1947).
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Under universal jurisdiction, U.S. courts may take jurisdiction over
instances of official torture if it is generally recognized as a violation of
international law significant enough to threaten the interests "of civiliza-
tion everywhere." 269 The Filartiga court suggested that official torture
cases were of such significance that U.S. courts could take jurisdiction
under the ATS through the universal jurisdiction principle. 270 In Tel-Oren,
Judge Edwards also suggested the potential use of universal jurisdiction to
support jurisdiction.27' By adopting this suggestion,2 72 the Trajano court
supported their holding that the ATS, as a manifestation of the doctrine of
hostis humani generis, properly confers jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts
of official torture.
c. Possible constitutional limitations-Due Process Nexus
Although the doctrine of transitory torts and the protective and universal
principles justify ATS jurisdiction, the'ability of these principles to extend
ATS jurisdiction over extraterritorial torts is limited by the Constitution.
Although the transitory tort doctrine allows the plaintiff to bring suit in
any country where the defendant is found, a suit brought in the United
States must meet the reasonableness requirement afforded by the right to
Due Process under the Constitution.2 73 The Supreme Court has held
that, in order for a court to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant in accord-
ance with Due Process, the defendant must "have certain minimum con-
tacts with [the territory of the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 274
A defendant being sued for a transitory tort in the United States must,
at a minimum, have some contact more than mere physical presence in
the state to make the jurisdiction over him reasonable. To satisfy tradi-
tional notions of fair play,
[at least one] of the following minimum contacts [must] exist: defendant is a
citizen or resident of the United States; defendant is an alien present, not
just transitorily, in the United States; defendant, if a corporation, is a U.S.
corporation or foreign corporation with "continuous and systematic" con-
tacts in this country; defendant committed an extraterritorial tort which
had a direct or foreseeable effect in the United States; and (perhaps)
defendant has property in the United States. 275
269. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 60-61. ("The common denominator of hos-
tis humani generis seems to have been the magnitude of the threat posed by the acts,
coupled with the universality of condemnation of the acts.").
270. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
271. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788 (Edwards, J., concurring).
272. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 500.
273. Randall, supra note 4, at 69.
274. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (citations omitted)).
275. Randall, supra note 4, at 65 (footnotes omitted). Professor Randall continues,
"The specific types of minimum contacts listed are generally based on ... case law." Id.
n.316. The prominent cases in this area includes Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
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The requirement that one of these minimum contacts must exist limits the
doctrine of transitory torts' ability to authorize ATSjurisdiction over extra-
territorial torts.
The facts of the Trajano case satisfied the Due Process reasonableness
requirement. The defendants in this case had come to the United States
with the intention to remain in the States permanently. As permanent
residents of the United States, the defendants had sufficient contacts with
the forum state to establish the reasonableness of suit for Due Process
purposes.276
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit in Trajano has ruled on and provided answers to many
of the controversies surrounding the ATS. It ruled that the ATS does not
create a cause of action but is purely a jurisdictional statute.27 7 This con-
forms with the Second Circuit's construction in Filartiga and is supported
by the language and the historical context of the statute.278 Also consis-
tent with Filartiga, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
an independent cause of action in the local laws of the states involved.
279
This approach, though not expressly acknowledged by the courts, corre-
lates to the rules of decision approach advocated by several commenta-
tors.28 0 This rules of decision approach avoids the problems of trying to
create a cause of action from international law, a body of law that tradi-
tionally does not provide a cause of action, 281 and provides a simple and
intuitive approach to torts falling under the ATS.
The Ninth Circuit also considered the scope of the ATS. The court's
reliance on Chuidian to explicate ATS liability for those acting under the
color of law clarifies the problem initiated by Amerada Hess of defining
proper ATS defendants. Determining liability from the nature of the vio-
lation also provides a workable approach to define the liability of private
individuals not associated with a state government.282 The Ninth Circuit
also considered the applicability of the ATS to extraterritorial torts and
held that jurisdiction is proper if the three ATS elements are satisfied. 283
Although the court did not consider limits to the ATS's applicability to
extraterritorial torts, some limitations are necessary. As Judge Bork and
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); and Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
276. See Randall, supra note 4, at 66-67 (applying Due Process reasonableness to Miar-
tiga and Tel-Oren determining that minimum contacts requirement were satisfied).
277. Id. at 503.
278. See supra notes 50-57, 193-205 and accompanying text.
279. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503.
280. See generally Crockett, supra note 51, at 46-50; Casto, supra note 11, at 473-88;
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 97-103.
281. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
282. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
283. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 499.
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Judge Robb noted in their Tel-Oren concurrences,2 84 principles of separa-
tion of powers and political sensitivity of the controversies should be con-
sidered when the judiciary hears and rules on them. If considered in light
of such limiting principles 2 85 the courts should be able to strike a func-
tional balance in ATS cases, a balance which allows the courts to work
justice by compensating victims who are injured and deserve appropriate
remedy while avoiding infringement upon the powers of the political
branches and upon the sovereignty of foreign states.
284. See generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring); Id. at 823-27
(Robb, J., concurring).
285. These limiting principles include constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, see
supra part III.B.2.c.; traditional concepts in international law, see supra part III.B.2.a.;
and the Act of State doctrine, see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 107-12.
